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ABSTRACT
Robots have gained relevance in society, increasingly performing critical tasks. Nonethe-
less, robot security is being underestimated. Robotics security is a complex landscape,
which often requires a cross-disciplinar perspective to which classical security lags be-
hind. To address this issue, we present the Robot Security Framework (RSF), a methodol-
ogy to perform systematic security assessments in robots. We propose, adapt and develop
specific terminology and provide guidelines to enable a holistic security assessment fol-
lowing four main layers (Physical, Network, Firmware and Application). We argue that
modern robotics should regard as equally relevant internal and external communication
security. Finally, we advocate against ”security by obscurity”. We conclude that the field
of security in robotics deserves further research efforts.
1 INTRODUCTION
Robots are going mainstream. From assistance and entertainment robots used in homes, to those working
in assembly lines in industry and all the way to those deployed in medical and professional facilities. For
many, robotics is called to be the next technological revolution. Yet, similar to what happened at the dawn of
the computer or the mobile phone industries, there is evidence suggesting that security in robotics is being
underestimated. Even though the first dead human from a robot happened back in 1979 Kravets (2010), the
consequences of using these cyber-physical systems in industrial manufacturing Whymant (2014); Huggler
(2015), professional Farivar (2016); Unknown (2015) or commercial Vincent (2016) environments are still
to trigger further research actions in the robotics security field.
Over the last 10 years, the domains of security and cybersecurity have been substantially democratized,
attracting individuals to many sub-areas within security assessment. According to recent technical reports
summarizing hacker activity per sector hackerone (2017; 2018), most security researchers are currently
working assessing vulnerabilities in websites (70.8%), mobile phones (smartphones, 5.6%) and Internet of
the Things (IoT) devices (2.6%), amongst others. Notwithstanding the relevance of robot vulnerabilities
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for most sectors of application, no formal study has yet published relevant data about robotics nor seems to
be an active area of research. We believe that the main reasons for this gap are twofold. In a first aspect,
security for robots is a complex subject from a technological perspective. It requires an interdisciplinary
mix of profiles, including security researchers, roboticists, software engineers and hardware engineers. In a
second aspect and to the best of our knowledge, there are few guidelines, tools and formal documentation
to assess robot security Sedgewick (2014); of Standards & Technology (2016). Overall, robot security is an
emerging challenge that needs to be addressed immediately.
In an attempt to provide a solution for the second problem, this paper presents the Robot Security Framework
(RSF), a systematic methodology for performing security assessments in robotics. We argue that security,
privacy and safety in robotic systems should clearly be recognized as a major issue in the field. Our frame-
work proposes a standardized methodology to identify, classify and report vulnerabilities for robots within a
formal operational protocol. Throughout the description of the RSF, we present exemplary scenarios where
robots are subject to the security issues hereby exposed.
The sections below are organized as follows: Section 2 describes previous work in the field of security for
robots. Section 3 elaborates upon the proposed framework. Finally, Section 4 draws major conclusions out
of our work.
2 PREVIOUS WORK
Robot security is becoming a concern that extends rapidly. However, to date, and as already briefed in the In-
troduction section, there are few honest and laudable efforts that elaborate into methodologies for analyzing
robot’s security or cybersecurity. The most relevant of those pioneering contributions is Shyvakov’s work
Shyvakov (2017). Him and collaborators aimed to develop a preliminary security framework for robots,
described from a penetration tester’s perspective. The cited research piece is, to the best of our knowledge,
the best piece of literature addressing robot security concerns. Nonetheless, on the basis of the content and
structure of that particular work, we largely found motivation for the present work. We found extremely
relevant to review, discuss, complete it, and motivate the full picture assesment from a robotics standpoint.
The author’s Shyvakov (2017) classification proposed 4 levels of security: a) physical security, b) network
security, c) operating system security and d) application security. However, we find that the author lacks
to some extent, the background knowledge related to the robotics field, particularly regarding the internal
organization of these systems. For instance, he states that robot have ”internal networks for wiring together
internal components (nodes), yet, these networks miss the fact that each is a security critical element which
can potentially influence the overall robot security”. Shyvakov even includes a brief category, devoted to
internal networks, within his proposed framework. However, under the assumption that ”normal user is
usually not supposed to connect to the internal network”, he advises that of cases where ”it is not possible
to implement full network monitoring due to hardware limitations but provides no further details on the
rationale. By claiming that At least there should be a capability to detect new unauthorized devices on
the network” he suggests the idea that dedicated robot network security is needed. Moreover, the author
discusses that ”thresholds on IDS of the internal network should be lower than on the external network” but
provides no additional foundation for such a claim. We argue that such approach would lead to an incomplete
security framework by obscurity. We also believe that modern robotics should converge towards enforcing
identical security levels on both inner and outer communication interfaces. Therefore, we advocate for an
holistic approach to robot security on the communications level into which we will elaborate.
In an attempt of providing real use-case scenarios, the author Shyvakov (2017) recommends a preliminary
implementation of the framework and provides exemplification for real robots, yet this particular part of his
work remains hidden or sanitized. Even if the reasons behind this to be kept confidential may include the
interest of robot manufacturers or stakeholders, it does little favour for actual enforcement of any security
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framework. Therefore, we find it necessary to provide illustrative real public cases whereto any framework
may be applied.
Other contributions to robot security, have primarily focused upon providing only partial contributions, e.g.
hardening particular aspects of robots, such as middleware Dieber et al. (2017), and elaborated on further
efforts towards the application aspect Dieber et al. (2016) or the lower communication aspects Breiling et al.
(2017).
Recently, some pieces of research such as Park & Shin (2017) have brought focus onto the necessity of a
framework for the evaluation of IoT device security. Such existing frameworks were targeted by Shyvakov
(2017) and duly criticized as not suitable due to incompleteness. We share the view that IoT frameworks
are not applicable nor valid to provide guidance into the assessment of security to the robotics landscape.
It is a common misconception that robots are a particular subset of IoT devices. Due to the fact that robots
are often orders of magnitude more complex than common IoT devices, robots are to be considered, if any,
a sophistication of a ”network of computers”, consisting of a distributed logic working in an array of sen-
sors, actuators, power mechanisms, user interfaces and other modules that have particular connectivity and
modularity requirements. Other recent researches such as Giaretta et al. (2018) claim to perform structured
security assessment of a particular IoT robot. Yet, all these aforementioned pieces of research remain, in our
opinion, very partial and not stablishing the. Therefore, we find it necessary to systematize assessment by
further elaborating on a common and universal reference procedure for robotic systems.
Inspired by the current state of the art, inter alia Dieber et al. (2016); Breiling et al. (2017); Dieber et al.
(2017); Shyvakov (2017), we propose the subsequent Robot Security Framework (RSF). We also extend
the initial ideas presented in prior art and add our contribution from a roboticist’s perspective. Our main
contributions on top of previous work are:
• Reformulation of the categorization terms. In particular, the term component becomes aspect.
Component is a rather generic term in robotics and it typically refers to a discrete and identifi-
able unit that may be combined with other parts to form a larger entity Association et al. (2017).
Components can be either software or hardware. Even a component that is mainly software or
hardware can be referred to as a software or hardware component respectively. In order to avoid
any confusions, rather than component, the term aspect will be used to categorize each layer within
RSF.
• Overall restructuring of the content. The original structure of the work presented by Shyvakov
Shyvakov (2017) hinders its comprehension, specially for those more familiar with robots and
their components. Therefore, we propose a layer-aspect-criteria structure where each criteria is
analyzed in terms of its objective, the rationale or relevance, and the systematics of assessment or
method.
• Formalized firmware layer. We adopt a commonly accepted definition of firmware suitable for the
context of robotics: software that is embedded in robots. We apply this definition to the previous
’Firmware and Operating System layer’ and generalize it simply as ’Firmware layer’. Besides the
operating system, we include robot middleware as a relevant topic of assessment and group them
both into Firmware, according to the adopted definition.
• Adoption of generic ”component” and ”module” terms. As an alternative to the proposed ”in-
ternal component” and ”external component” terminology, we suggest the generic terms ”compo-
nent”, as defined above, and ”module”. Both are commonly accepted as a component with special
characteristics that facilitate system design, integration, inter-operability and re-use. This way, we
simplify the message when speaking about components1. In light of the above, we elaborate on the
1The term ”internal components” can lead to misunderstandings. For some, internal components are those physically
embedded within the robot exoskeleton. According to others, internal components are those that physically define each
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following notion: robots are composed by components and modules. Some of them are physically
exposed and some others are not. Among the modules and components, some are part of the ”in-
ternal network”, thereby hidden from the outside from a network perspective, whereas others are
freely accessible from the outside and thereby part of the external network.
• Improved internal networking security model. As pointed out above, according to our vision,
modern robotics should converge towards the enforcement of identically strict security levels on
both internal and external communication interfaces. Therefore, we propose changes to assess
internal network security and justify them by presenting existing study cases.
• Improved model for physical tampering attacks. We include a series of aspects and criteria to
detect physical attacks on robots. We highlight the use of logging mechanisms, already present in
most robots, in order to monitor suspicious physical changes therein.
• Added exemplary scenarios. Throughout the framework content we add exemplary scenarios to
illustrate how our methodology helps to assess the security of existing robots.
• We open source our work and provide a variety of user-friendly representations to sim-
plify its adoption. This work is available and freely accessible at https://github.com/
aliasrobotics/RSF under GPLv3 license.
We believe that an integrated approach needs to be adopted to enable a mechanistic understanding that
empowers reliable assessment of robot security. To this end, the following section describes our framework.
3 THE ROBOT SECURITY FRAMEWORK
We hereby propose a framework based on four layers that are relevant to robotic systems. We subsequently
divide them into aspects considered relevant to be covered. Likewise, we provide relevant criteria applicable
for security assessment. For each of these criteria we identify what needs to be assessed (objective), why to
address such (rationale) and how to systematize evaluation (method), as summarized in Figure 1.
3.1 PHYSICAL – layer
3.1.1 PORTS – aspect
• Presence of external communication ports – criteria
– Objective: Identify presence of unprotected external ports.
– Rationale: Unprotected external ports can let attackers in physical proximity to perform a
variety of attacks and serve as an entry point for them.
– Method:
∗ Inspect documentation, consult developers and inspect robot’s body and components.
Look for accessible ports (e.g. Ethernet, USB, CAN, etc.).
∗ Open all doors which are not protected by locks and look for ports inside.
• Presence of internal communication ports – criteria
– Objective: Identify presence of unprotected internal ports that typically correspond with sen-
sors, user interfaces, power or other robot-related components.
discrete and identifiable component and, thereby, should not be exposed nor taken into consideration from a security
perspective. Ultimately, there is a third school of thought that classifies internal and external components based on a
networking point of view, considering as ”internal components” only those that are connected to the internal network
(with no external interface access).
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Figure 1: The Robot Security Framework standardized methodology: RSF is formed by 4 layers (physical, network,
firmware, application) where relevant aspects are identified. Each aspect has different evaluation criteria which are
analyzed by three points: (1) objective or description of the evaluation, (2) rationale or importance of such aspect and
(3) method or systematic action plan.
Figure 2: The a) Physical layer identifies the b) Ports and Components aspects, which have been analyzed with the
corresponding c)criteria.
– Rationale: Unplugging robot components can potentially lead to the exposure of internal
communication ports. Typically, these internal communication ports are not protected in
5
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robots. This may serve as an entry point and allow attackers in physical proximity to per-
form a variety of attacks.
– Method:
∗ Firstly, open any door not protected by a lock. Secondly, open those protected, and look
for robot components and their buses.
∗ Investigate ventilation holes and see if they are wide enough to access internal communi-
cation ports.
Exemplary robot scenario 1 Physical security, exploitation of communication ports in robots
As reported by Cerrudo et al. Cerrudo & Apa (2017a;b), physical attacks are possible when adversaries can access to the
robot’s hardware or mechanics to modify its behaviour or set up a persistent threat. Often, robots expose external ports.
Such is the case of robots like Rethink Robotics’ Baxter, Universal Robots’ UR3 or Aldebaran Robotics’ (acquired by
Softbank Robotics) Pepper. In their study, Cerrudo and Apa present and demonstrate three main threats for exposed
connectivity ports: USB ports, Ethernet ports and power ports. The authors present examples where each one of these
threats are systematically exploited. Surprisingly, in some cases, critical damage to the robot can be caused by solely
connecting a USB dongle Singh.
• Security of external and internal communication ports – criteria
– Objective: Verify if attackers can sniff or modify any critical data during communication with
a docking station or by connecting to the ports.
– Rationale: Unprotected external and internal ports can let attackers in physical proximity to
perform a variety of attacks by serving as an entry point into them.
– Method:
∗ Try to connect to the identified communication ports:
· Determine if authentication is required (e.g. Network access control for Ethernet).
· Assess whether the communication is encrypted.
· Try communicating with them, attempt fuzzing to discover if robot’s state can be af-
fected.
∗ If a robot connects to a docking station to transfer some data, try to use sniffers to see how
data exchange is being done (e.g. verify if some sensitive, configuration or control data is
transferred in clear text).
3.1.2 COMPONENTS – aspect:
• Availability of components from outside – criteria
– Objective: Identify internal hardware that is accessible from outside.
– Rationale: Directly accessible components can be physically damaged, stolen, tampered,
removed or completely disabled causing the robot to misbehave. The most obvious example
is the removal of critical sensors for the behavior of the robot.
– Method:
∗ Inspect robots body and look for accessible components (e.g. sensors, actuators, compu-
tation units, user interfaces, power components, etc.).
∗ Open all doors which are not protected by locks and look for accessible components inside.
– Notes: All cables should also remain inside of the robot. Some components require to be
partially outside of the body frame (e.g. certain sensors such as range finders, or antennas of
certain wireless communication components), in such cases only the required part should stick
out, not the whole component.
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• Monitoring and alerting capabilities – criteria
– Objective: Identify whether rogue access to the internal hardware of the robot can be detected.
– Rationale: Having no verification whether the internals of the robot were accessed or not
means that attackers can easily tamper with any components or install a hardware trojan un-
noticeably.
– Method:
∗ Identify all parts of the frame that can be opened or removed to get access to the compo-
nents or modules.
∗ Check whether there is an active (tamper switches) or passive (tamper evident screws and
seals) monitoring capability present.
∗ In case of active monitoring capability, verify that the operator receives a real-time alert
and the incident is being logged and acted upon by reviewing procedures.
– Notes: Passive monitoring provides information upon inspection, whether internals were ac-
cessed or not. However, there is still a time window between inspections when exploited
robots can be abused.
• Review logs of physical changes in the robot – criteria
– Objective: Verify the logs of the robot and look for tampering actions. Log examples include
powering on/off events, connection/disconnection of physical components, sensor values or
actuator actions. Detect potential tampering based on this information.
– Rationale: Most robots register logs of a variety of events going from powering on/off the
robot to each individual component data. Specially, some robots detect physical changes on
their components and register it. Such changes could lead to an undetected tampering of the
system. Reviewing the logs could lead to discovering physical tampering of the robot.
– Method:
∗ Review the logs of powering on and off routines of the robot.
∗ Review the logs of physical changes in the robot.
∗ Review the logs of each individual component and look for anomalies.
3.2 NETWORK – layer
Figure 3: The Network layer includes the Internal robot network and External network aspects, which have been
analyzed with the corresponding criteria.
3.2.1 INTERNAL ROBOT NETWORK – aspect:
• Network accessibility – criteria:
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– Objective: Determine and assess network accessibility and the corresponding protection
mechanisms.
– Rationale: Internal networks could be password protected. If that’s the case, the correspond-
ing mechanisms should be up-to-date and ensure that only authenticated users are able to
access the network.
– Method
∗ Validate authentication mechanisms and verify that no known vulnerabilities are present
on such.
∗ If internal network is password protected, attempt common password guessing.
∗ Verify whether the robot logs both successful and unsuccessful login attempts.
• Network fingerprinting – criteria:
– Objective: Mitigate the fingerprinting impact on the internal networks.
– Rationale: Network fingerprinting is useful to understand the internal network structure and
its behavior, and to identify components’ operating system by analyzing packets from that
component. This information could be used for malicious purposes, since it provides fine-
grained determination of an operating system and its characteristics.
– Method:
∗ Perform fingerprinting attacks on the internal networks.
∗ Evaluate obtained information with the manufacturer’s available data and assess its impact.
∗ If necessary, propose a mitigation strategy through the use of ”scrubbers”, which will ”nor-
malize” the packets, and remove the unique identifying traits that the attacker is seeking.
Refer to Smart et al. (2000) for more details about the use of ”scrubbers”.
• Communication protocol security – criteria:
– Objective: Check if used communication protocol is up-to-date, secure and has no known
vulnerabilities.
– Rationale: Vulnerabilities in communication protocols can allow attackers to gain unautho-
rized access to the internal network of the robot and intercept or modify any transmitted data.
– Method:
∗ Identify all present communication capabilities by inspecting documentation, by consult-
ing developers or by manual analysis.
∗ Analyze if used protocol versions provide encryption and mutual authentication.
∗ Verify that used protocol is hardened according to industry standards.
• Monitoring, alert and response capabilities – criteria:
– Objective: Identify whether internal network activity is monitored, alerts are issued and cor-
responding actions are taken based on known signatures or anomalies.
– Rationale: Proper security controls on the internal network might be challenging due to hard-
ware limitations or performance requirements, although it is critical for robots to introspect,
monitor, report and act on issues that could appear on their internal networks. Security by ob-
scurity is unfortunately a commonly accepted approach in robotics, nevertheless, it has been
demonstrated that this approach leads to critically unsecured robots. Monitoring and control
capabilities should be implemented on the internal network of the robot either through the
manufacturer or through additional or external solutions. The decision of applying counter-
measures to the attack or only alerting should be determined by the impact of possible false
positives on the operative of the robot.
– Method:
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∗ Sweep the internal robot network and enumerate entry points (e.g. open ports, existing
component information, network map of components, etc).
∗ Try to match the fingerprints identified and to map known vulnerabilities.
∗ Connect to the network and attempt to perform network-based attacks (e.g. ARP poison-
ing, denial of service on a particular component, etc.).
∗ Verify whether the robot detects and registers incidents.
∗ Verify whether the robot acts upon such events and either:
· (The robot) responds to insult proactively.
· An operator receives a real time alert and acts based on procedures.
– Notes: In those cases where it is not possible to implement internal robot network monitoring,
alerting and response due to limitations on the robot capabilities, manufacturers should extend
their capabilities or refer to third party solutions that could offer such.
• Firewall – criteria:
– Objective: Identify whether internal network is separated from the external by the firewall.
– Rationale: Firewalls can help to further protect components, modules and communications
from the outside and ensure that they cannot accidentally leak data to the external network.
– Method:
∗ Inspect documentation, consult developers and inspect components which are responsible
for external communications. Identify that such components have firewalls.
∗ Inspect firewall settings and verify that no components or modules are allowed to commu-
nicate to the external network unless it is necessary.
∗ If a VPN is used, verify that there are rules which allow components or modules to com-
municate with the outside world only via the VPN tunnel.
– Notes: There should be a firewall per each interface with external networks. This means that
each communication component interfacing with an external channel should have a firewall
behind it or use third party solutions. For example, WiFi hotspots in robots or LTE/UMTS
transceivers.
Exemplary robot scenario 2 Internal robot network security
Robots are typically built by interconnecting different components (sensors, actuators, communication devices, etc.)
through internal networks. Most manufacturers, aware about the security risks, allocate resources in the protection of
the interface with external networks through firewalls, IDSs or other mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, few
robotic solutions care about internal networking. Most internal networks in robotic solutions are totally unprotected,
often unencrypted, and even when encrypted, authentication is unhandled, which can easily lead to Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks. Some pioneering pieces of research Shyvakov (2017) have reported that internal robot networks are
critical elements which can influence robots security, though they fail to acknowledge the latter’s relevance.
This security fault was illustrated in Cerrudo and Apa’s work Cerrudo & Apa (2017a;b), where they demonstrate how
Universal Robots’ UR3 exposes a number of services when connected to the internal network. Neither the internal
network, nor any of these services demands authentication. Thereby, any user connected to the internal network can
issue commands to these services and control/rule the robot as desired.
3.2.2 EXTERNAL NETWORK – aspect:
• Network accessibility – criteria:
– Objective: Determine and assess network accessibility and the corresponding protection
mechanisms.
– Rationale: External networks could be password protected. If that is the case, the corre-
sponding mechanisms should be up to date and ensure that only authenticated users are able
to access the network.
9
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– Method:
∗ Validate authentication mechanisms and verify that no known vulnerabilities are present
on such.
∗ If external network is password protected, attempt common password guessing.
∗ Verify whether the robot logs successful and unsuccessful login attempts.
Exemplary robot scenario 3 Unauthorized Modbus read and write requests
As reported by Cerrudo and Apa Cerrudo & Apa (2017a;b), Universal Robots’ UR3, UR5 and UR10 have a default
Modbus service (port 502) that does not provide authentication of the source of a command. According to the authors,
”an adversary may attempt to corrupt the robot in a state to negatively affect the process being controlled. An attacker
with IP connectivity to the robot can issue Modbus write requests. This could change the state of the robot, make it
interoperable, or send requests to actuators to change the state of the joints being controlled.”
• Network fingerprinting – criteria:
– Objective: Mitigate the fingerprinting impact on the external networks.
– Rationale: Network fingerprinting is useful to understand the network structure and its behav-
ior, as well as to identify devices’ operating system by analyzing packets from that network.
This information could be used for malicious purposes since it provides fine-grained determi-
nation of an operating system and its characteristics.
– Method:
∗ Perform fingerprinting attacks on the external network.
∗ Evaluate obtained information with the manufacturer’s available data and assess its impact.
∗ If necessary, propose a mitigation strategy through the use of ”scrubbers”, which will ”nor-
malize” the packets, and remove the unique identifying traits that the attacker is seeking.
Refer to Smart et al. (2000) for more details about the use of ”scrubbers”.
Exemplary robot scenario 4 Network fingerprinting of robots
According to Cerrudo and Apa Cerrudo & Apa (2017a;b), finding certain robots in large networks is trivial and can
be done using simple multicast DNS (mDNS). The authors report that these machines advertise their presence on the
network through mDNS. Computers located in the same subnetwork and with support for mDNS can resolve the robot’s
hostname and easily reach it. Some examples are provided below:
• Softbank Robotics’ Nao default hostname is ”nao.local”.
• Softbank Robotics’ Pepper default hostname is ”nao.local”, also publicly available in the official documenta-
tion Aldebaran Robotics.
• Rethink Robotics’ Baxter and Sawyer default hostname is the serial number followed by local. E.g.
”011303P0017.local” or ”< robotname > .local”, also confirmed in Rethink’s official documentation
Rethink Robotics.
• Universal Robots’ UR3, UR5 and UR10 default hostname is ”ur.local”.
All of them hardcoded, regardless of the device itself.
• Communication protocol security – criteria
– Objective: Check if used communication protocol is up-to-date, secure and has no known
vulnerabilities.
– Rationale: Vulnerabilities in communication protocols can allow attackers to gain unautho-
rized access to the external network of the robot and intercept or modify any transmitted data.
10
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– Method:
∗ Identify all communication capabilities being present by inspecting documentation, con-
sulting developers or by manual analysis.
∗ Analyze if used protocol versions provide encryption and mutual authentication.
∗ Verify that used protocol is hardened according to industry standards.
– Notes: If providing encryption on the protocol level is not possible for some reasons, VPN or
application level encryption should be used.
• Network ports exposure – criteria:
– Objective: Identify whether only necessary network ports are exposed to the external network.
– Rationale: More open ports mean a bigger attack surface and therefore their number should
be as low as possible. Services that are exposed should have no known vulnerabilities due to
the ease of their exploitation.
– Method:
∗ Connect to the network that is being used by the robot for communication and scan all
robot ports to find the open ones. Verify in manufacturer manuals whether their presence
is required.
∗ Identify, if possible, services running behind an open port and its version.
∗ Verify whether identified services are still receiving security updates and have no known
vulnerabilities.
• Monitoring, alert and response capabilities – criteria
– Objective: Identify whether the external network activity is being monitored, alerts are issued
based on known signatures or anomalies, and appropriate actions are taken.
– Rationale: Properly configured external network monitoring can spot network based attacks
in their inception even if other security mechanisms are compromised.
– Method:
∗ Sweep the external robot network and enumerate entry points (e.g. open ports, protocol
information, network map of components, robot components etc.).
∗ Try to match the fingerprints identified and map to known vulnerabilities.
∗ Perform network based attacks (e.g. ARP poisoning, denial of service on a particular
component).
∗ Verify whether the robot detects and registers incidents on the external network.
∗ Verify whether the robot acts upon such events and either:
· (The robot) responds to insult proactively.
· An operator receives a real time alert and acts based on procedures.
– Notes: In those cases where it is not possible to implement external robot network monitoring,
alerting and response due to limitations on the robot capabilities, manufacturers should extend
their capabilities or refer to third party solutions that could offer such.
3.3 FIRMWARE – layer
3.3.1 OPERATING SYSTEM (OS) – aspect
• Underlying OS updates – criteria
– Objective: Verify that the used Operating System (OS) is still supported by the manufacturer
and there is a mechanism to perform system updates.
– Rationale: Outdated operating systems can have security vulnerabilities.
11
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Figure 4: The Firmware layer includes the Operating System, Middleware and Firmware aspects, which have been
analyzed with the corresponding criteria.
– Method:
∗ Check if the underlying OS is still maintained and able to recieve security patches.
∗ Check whether the latest security updates are applied.
∗ Check if there is an update mechanism present and enabled.
∗ Check if updates are authenticated when transferred to the robot.
3.3.2 MIDDLEWARE – aspect
• Verify code compliance (if accessible) – criteria
– Objective: In those cases where it applies (white box assessment), ensure compliance of
middleware code against established compliance mechanisms.
– Rationale: As robotics and autonomy grow, especially in certain fields of robotics, users of
middlewares need to be able to determine if the software is able to be used in a safety-critical
environment. With suitable guidance and modification, it is expected that middleware code
could be integrated as part of certain compliant system. For this purpose, code should be
developed and reviewed following certain guidelines. The most common one is the Motor
Industry Software Reliability Association (MISRA), widely used in many safety-critical envi-
ronments and adopted by the ROS 2 middleware.
– Method:
∗ Determine the exact set of guidelines that are being applied.
∗ Validate whether these guidelines have been implemented.
• Middleware updates – criteria
– Objective: Verify that the used middleware is still maintained and supported by the manufac-
turer. Verify the capacity to perform system updates.
– Rationale: Outdated middlewares in robotics are subject to have security vulnerabilities. This
is specially true with ROS, ROS 2 and other robot-related middlewares.
– Method:
∗ Check if the underlying middleware is still maintained and able to recieve security patches.
∗ Check whether the latest security updates are applied.
∗ Check if there is an update mechanism present and enabled.
∗ Check if the updates are encrypted when transferred to the robot.
3.3.3 FIRMWARE – aspect
• Firmware updates – criteria
– Objective: Check if manufacturer firmware can be securely updated.
12
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– Rationale: If new vulnerabilities are discovered it is important to ensure that there is a way
to provide updates to all the devices that are already sold to customers. However, update
mechanisms can be circumvented by an attacker to deliver malicious updates. Therefore, it is
important to verify the origin of the update prior to installation.
– Method:
∗ Identify if there is a mechanism to deliver firmware updates.
∗ Verify whether updates are cryptographically signed.
∗ Verify that the signature is verified prior to installation.
Exemplary robot scenario 5 Insecure firmware upgrade in Nao and Pepper robots
As reported by Cerrudo and Apa Cerrudo & Apa (2017a;b), Softbank Robotics’ Nao and Pepper robots are subject
to a firmware upgrade vulnerability due to insecure firmware upgrade mechanism. According to the authors, ”It is
possible to upgrade system components with unsigned firmware images by skipping the signature integrity check.” This
vulnerability applies to Softbank’s NAOqi framework, a proprietary robot programming framework used in Softbank
Robotics’ products. In particular, NAOqi 2.1.4.13 (NAO), NAOqi 2.4.3.28 (Pepper) and NAOqi 2.5.5.5 (Pepper) have
been found vulnerable.
3.4 APPLICATION – layer
Figure 5: The Application layer includes the Authorization, Privacy, Integrity, Accounts,Communication, 3rd party
libraries and components and Control center application aspects, which have been analyzed with the corresponding
criteria.
3.4.1 AUTHORIZATION – aspect
• Access control – criteria
– Objective: Verify that resources are accessible only to authorized users or services.
– Rationale: Access to the restricted functions by anonymous users or users with lower access
control rights diminishes all the benefits of access control.
– Method:
∗ Log in with authorized credentials and attempt to perform different actions, record the
requests that are being made.
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∗ Log out and attempt to send the same requests as an unauthenticated user. Verify whether
it is successful.
∗ Log out and log in again as a user with lower access rights. Attempt to send the same
requests again. Verify whether it is successful.
3.4.2 PRIVACY – aspect
• Privacy assessment – criteria
– Objective: Identify whether the robot is compliant to the privacy policies that apply.
– Rationale: Not complying with privacy standards could result in a breach of personal data.
– Method:
∗ Verify that minimum Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is collected and transmitted
over the internet.
∗ Verify that if PII is collected users are made aware of it (e.g. in case of a video recording
people can be warned by stickers or signs on the robot).
∗ Verify that all PII is stored and transmitted in a secure manner.
• Data protection – criteria
– Objective: Identify whether the robot manufacturer emplaces mechanisms to ensure compli-
ance to the data protection regulations and laws that apply. Particularly, General Data Protec-
tion Regulation (GDPR) in the EU.
– Rationale: Not complying with regulations could result in penalties.
– Method:
∗ Assess the legitimate interests.
∗ Assess the consent.
∗ Assess the information provisions.
∗ Assess the third party data.
∗ Assess the profiling.
∗ Assess the legacy data.
– Note: This criteria is not relevant to the security of the robot itself. However, not complying
with data protection regulations can result in financial penalties and should therefore be taken
into consideration in organizations using robots.
3.4.3 INTEGRITY – aspect
• Integrity check – criteria
– Objective: Identify whether the system performs an integrity check of critical components
and takes action if they are not present or modified.
– Rationale: Tampering with any of the critical components can make the robot cause physical
damage to people and property.
– Method:
∗ Consult documentation and developers to find whether integrity check for critical compo-
nents is present.
∗ Try disabling or modifying critical components (e.g. safety sensors or range finding sys-
tems) of the robot and check if the operator receives a real-time alert and the incident is
being logged.
∗ Check whether the robot continues to function afterwards. Its operation should be stopped
as soon as any critical component is disabled or modified, (e.g. if a proximity sensor is
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disabled the robot should not be able to move, because it will not be able to spot obstacles
and can easily do some physical damage).
– Note: Critical components are those that can directly influence the robot’s operation, func-
tionality or safety.
3.4.4 ACCOUNTS – aspect
• Default passwords – criteria
– Objective: Identify presence of default passwords.
– Rationale: Default passwords are easily accessible online and remain the most popular and
effortless way to exploit internet connected devices.
– Method:
∗ Review documentation and consult developers to identify whether default passwords are
used.
∗ Attempt to log in with commonly used passwords.
∗ If default passwords are used, verify whether their change is encouraged on the first use.
∗ If unique passwords are created on a per device basis, ensure that they are random and not
in a sequential order.
– Note: When trying commonly used passwords, beware of account lockouts and verify that
there is a recovery mechanism present.
• Password complexity – criteria
– Objective: Verify that password complexity is enforced.
– Rationale: Weak passwords may take little time to guess.
– Method: Attempt to change the password to a weak one and verify whether this change
succeeded.
– Note: Password complexity requirements depend on the sensitivity of the application. In
general, the minimum requirements that should be in place are:
∗ A password length of, at least, 8 characters.
∗ Enforce the usage of 3 of this 4 categories:lower-case, upper-case, numbers, special char-
acters.
• Login Lockout – criteria
– Objective: Identify whether the login lockout is present.
– Rationale: Having strong and non-default passwords may not be enough. Brute force attempts
should be prevented by implementing a login lockout mechanism.
– Method: Attempt to log in with incorrect credentials multiple times. Verify that the account
has got a lockout.
– Note: The lockout threshold depends on the sensitivity of the service. In general, there should
be 5 login attempts or less. Prior to testing, verify that the lockout recovery mechanism is
being present. Accounts can be either locked out for a specific duration of time and/or they
can be recovered by physical interaction with the robot.
• Hardcoded or backdoor accounts – criteria
– Objective: Identify presence of hardcoded or backdoor accounts.
– Rationale: Hardcoded or backdoor credentials pose the same danger as default passwords.
However, their identification is usually harder due to the need for reverse engineering or pos-
session of the source code.
– Method:
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∗ Consult documentation and developers to identify whether hardcoded or backdoor creden-
tials are used.
∗ Analyze the source code for hardcoded or backdoor credentials.
• Cleartext passwords – criteria
– Objective: Identify whether passwords are stored in cleartext.
– Rationale: Cleartext passwords can be leveraged by an attacker for privilege escalation or
lateral movement.
– Method:
∗ Review the source code and documentation, consult developers and identify whether pass-
words are stored in a cleartext.
– Note: Lockout threshold depends on the sensitivity of the service. In general, there should be
5 login attempts or less.
3.4.5 COMMUNICATION – aspect
• Encryption – criteria
– Objective: Ensure that all sensitive data is transmitted over an encrypted channel.
– Rationale: If data is transmitted in a cleartext attackers can easily gather sensitive information
(e.g. credentials, audio and video streams, private data).
– Method:
∗ Intercept connection between a robot and a control center application or a cloud server.
∗ Use protocol analyzer to verify that transmitted data is encrypted.
• Replay protection – criteria
– Objective: Ensure that transmitted data cannot be replayed.
– Rationale: If replay protection is absent, attackers can record legitimate packets and then
arbitrarily replay them to achieve desired actions.
– Method:
∗ Intercept the connection between the robot and a control center application or a cloud
server.
∗ Record the control or configuration packets sent to/by the robot.
∗ Attempt to replay the packets and verify whether the desired action is executed.
3.4.6 3RD PARTY LIBRARIES AND COMPONENTS – aspect
• Vulnerabilities – criteria
– Objective: Verify that 3rd party software components do not have known vulnerabilities.
– Rationale: It is quite common to blindly rely on 3rd party components. However they can
easily introduce a vulnerability into the product where they are used.
– Method:
∗ Identify which 3rd party libraries and components are used and what are their versions.
∗ Look for known vulnerabilities in the current version.
∗ Verify whether the identified component is still receiving security updates and has no un-
patched vulnerabilities.
∗ Verify that the latest security updates are installed.
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3.4.7 CONTROL CENTER APPLICATION – aspect
• Web application – criteria
– Objective: Perform a security assessment of the web application.
– Rationale: The robot can be indirectly compromised if the attacker exploits a web control
center application.
– Method:
∗ Identify web interface that is being used (hosted on the robot itself or a cloud server).
∗ Use OWASP methodology to test web application against OWASP Top 10 Web application
vulnerabilities.
• Mobile application – criteria
– Objective: Perform a security assessment of the mobile application.
– Rationale: The robot can be indirectly compromised if the attacker exploits a mobile phone
control center application.
– Method:
∗ Identify whether the robot has a mobile app that can be used to control or interact with it.
∗ Test the application against OWASP Mobile Top 10.
Exemplary robot scenario 6 Android application updates in UBTech Robotics’ robots
According to Cerrudo and Apa Cerrudo & Apa (2017a;b), UBTech Robotics’ Alpha 1S robot is subject to a vulnerability
when updates are triggered from its official Android application. The authors report that ”the Alpha 1S android appli-
cation does not verify any cryptographic signature when downloading and installing the APK update into the mobile
device. Furthermore, due to ’App-to-Server Missing Encryption’ it is possible to perform a man-in-the-middle attack in
order to change the APK URL and install a customized malware on the device.”
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Robot privacy, integrity and security should be major concerns in a society that increasingly relies on such
cyber-physical systems. Few honest efforts have been conducted to address robot security systematics. How-
ever, a deep understanding of the discipline’s landscape, along with vast cross-disciplinary approaches, is
crucial to provide an integrated security assessment for robotics. The research work herein presents the
Robot Security Framework (RSF): a standardized methodology that enables holistic evaluation of robot se-
curity. Furthermore, RSF is provided with illustrative practical real-world examples. Following a roboticist’s
security approach, our contribution aims at shedding light onto the robot security scene, an area which has re-
mained obscure insofar. Now as then, as well as for the future, we are convinced that a reliable, reproducible
and systematic security assessment is a must in any modern use-case of robotics.
Future research is envisioned with regard to constant improvement and testing of RSF. An open source
template of our security framework is available at http://github.com/aliasrobotics/RSF and
licensed under GPLv3. We kindly invite security researchers, robotic researchers and analysts to review,
challenge and complement our work.
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